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Abstract 
 
Despite much research on age and attitudes, it remains unclear whether age reflects accumulated 
life experience or conditions prevailing during an individual’s formative years – that is, a life-cycle effect 
or a cohort effect. In respect to attitudes towards the European Union (EU) the issue is particularly 
important. Although many analyses indicate a correlation between age and support, the relationship has 
not been adequately theorized and extant analyses have generated contradictory results. We develop 
theoretical expectations for both life-cycle and cohort effects on support for the EU, and test those 
expectations using a cross random effects model. In so doing, we not only identify the nature of an age-
support relationship but also explain the inconsistencies in extant empirical analyses. 
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For much of the last fifty years European integration was an elite driven process. Public opinion, 
following Lindberg and Scheingold (1970), provided a ‘permissive consensus’ – the public was generally 
supportive of the process and willing to leave decisions to political elites. The Danish rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, effectively signaled the end of this consensus. Since then, at four additional 
referendums, national publics rejected proposals for further integration (Ireland, the Nice Treaty, in 2001; 
France and the Netherlands, the Constitutional Treaty, in 2005; and, Ireland, the Reform Treaty, in 2008). 
In tandem, aggregate public support for the EU declined from its high point in the early 1990s and the 
European public appears more divided on the EU’s merits than at any time in the last three decades (e.g. 
Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; Down and Wilson, 2008). More importantly still, numerous studies also 
indicate that positioning on the EU affects the performance of parties at national elections (e.g. Carruba, 
2001; Evans, 1999; Evans and Butt, 2007; Gabel, 2000; Kriesi, 2007; Tillman, 2004). In short, not only 
does public opinion on the EU matter, but understanding that opinion appears increasingly important for 
understanding both the future of the EU and the domestic politics of the member states. 
 
If we are to deepen our understanding of public opinion and enhance our capacity to develop 
predictive models we need to engage in closer examination and testing of the theoretical predicates of our 
models. One area that requires better theorizing and testing concerns the effect of age on attitudes towards 
the EU. Many recent studies indicate that the young are more supportive than the old (e.g. Brinegar and 
Jolly, 2005; Fligstein, 2008; McLaren, 2002 and 2006; Rohrschneider, 2002; Steenbergen and Jones, 
2002). Yet, some of the earliest work showed either no consistent relationship or a positive relationship 
between age and support for the EU (e.g. Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel 1998a and 1998b). Which 
finding, if either, is accurate is important, not only because they imply opposite outcomes for future 
opinion on the EU but also because age could theoretically be tapping two quite distinct and independent 
effects. Specifically, age may represent a life-cycle effect, in which attitudes towards the EU vary across 
the life-cycle, either becoming more positive or negative as individuals age. Alternatively, age may 
represent a generational effect, in which different cohorts display systematically different attitudes 
towards the EU.  
 
Identifying which, if either, of these two effects is at work is important because, as we elaborate 
in more detail below, if they are both operative they may work at cross purposes to one another. Thus, for 
example, if support for the EU is negatively/positively related to age then in conjunction with the 
population aging process evident in Western Europe a life-cycle effect implies declining/increasing future 
support for the EU as the elderly comprise an ever larger proportion of the population. Conversely, 
however, if a negative/positive relationship between age and support is tapping a generational effect, then 
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future support for the EU may increase/decrease as older cohorts are replaced by their younger 
counterparts. Accordingly, both the possibility that age is reflective of different underlying processes and 
the apparently contradictory nature of extant findings suggests we need to both accurately theorize the 
effect of age on attitudes, as well as determine whether age is indeed systematically related to support for 
the EU.  
 
To briefly presage our findings, we do find a statistically significant relationship between age and 
support for the EU, and one that is composed of both a life-cycle and a generational component. In the 
following we first explain the theoretical bases for respectively a life-cycle effect and a generation or 
cohort effect on attitudes towards Europe. We then highlight a methodological problem that any analysis 
confronts in attempting to parse the effects of life-cycle and cohort, and explain how we address that 
problem. Next, we provide the analyses and illustrate how and why it is that different studies of public 
opinion towards the EU have generated seemingly contradictory findings, as well as reconciling those 
apparent contradictions. Finally, on the basis of the results and what we know of the population ageing 
process in Europe, we also produce some preliminary forecasts of the effects of age on future public 
attitudes towards the EU. 
 
Theorizing Life-Cycle and Generational Effects 
Considerable research has addressed the question of the relationship between age and political 
attitudes (see, for example, Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Cutler, 1976; De Vries, 2005; Dirk De Graaf and 
Evans, 1996; Inglehart, 1971, 1990 & 1995; Jennings, 1987 & 2002; Jennings and Niemi, 1978 & 1981; 
Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Lewis-Beck, et al, 2008; Tilley, 2000 & 2002). Yet it remains unclear whether 
age represents a measure of accumulated life experience or a measure of the conditions prevailing during 
an individual’s formative years – that is, whether age represents difference across the life-cycle or 
difference between generations. In some instances resolving the issue can be critical to our understanding 
of observed political attitudes, and support for the European Union (EU) is a case in point. Increasingly, 
studies of attitudes towards the EU indicate that the young are more supportive than the old (e.g. Brinegar 
and Jolly, 2005; Fligstein, 2008; McLaren, 2002 and 2006; Rohrschneider, 2002; Steenbergen and Jones, 
2002). Whether this results from a life-cycle effect, in which individuals are more supportive when young 
than when old, or, a generational effect, in which more recent cohorts are more supportive than older 
cohorts, has not been determined. 
 
A life-cycle effect is rooted in the opportunities the EU affords individuals at different stages of 
their lives. In general, the young are better placed to take advantage of the opportunities created by the 
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EU, particularly for traveling, living, working and studying in other countries than are older adults. The 
young are less nationally rooted because they lack the responsibilities and concerns that typically come to 
encumber individuals as they age. Thus, for example, supporting and raising children, possibly servicing a 
mortgage, maintaining and developing a job/career (where opportunities remain primarily structured by 
national labor markets), along with the need to save and prepare for retirement all serve to constrain and 
limit the options of older adults. As such, at each age, the proportion of the public directly advantaged by 
opportunities arising from European integration should be smaller and thus so to should support for the 
EU.  It is worth noting that whether or not the young actually take advantage of the opportunities afforded 
by the EU should be of little importance in structuring attitudinal differences. What matters is that those 
opportunities exist for the young in a way that they do not for the old. In short, over the life-cycle we 
should expect to find a negative relationship between age and support for the EU.  There is certainly 
anecdotal evidence for the proposition since the public in general identify the young as far more likely to 
be winners from the process of European integration, than the middle-aged or the elderly (McLaren, 
2006). 
 
Hypothesis One: Support for the European Union declines across the life-cycle, such that older 
Europeans are less supportive than younger Europeans. 
 
The alternative basis for an age-support relationship rests on differences between cohorts, or 
generations. In this view attitudes are fundamentally shaped during adolescence, even if they are not 
necessarily entirely fixed and unchanging over the life-cycle. Adolescence is critical for political 
socialization because it is during adolescence that individuals are at their most impressionable (Jennings 
and Niemi, 1978; Jennings and Niemi, 1981; Sapiro, 2004). Thus, the conditions prevailing during 
adolescence are thought to structure the attitudes of individuals in a manner that persists throughout their 
life-time. As a result, generations may differ from one another in their attitudes due to differences in the 
social and political environment prevailing during their formative years (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; 
Inglehart, 1971 and 1990; Mannheim, 1952).
1
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 It should be noted, however, that not all members of a given generation will necessarily have the same 
relationship to a given environment or event(s) (Jennings, 1987 and 2002; Mannheim, 1952; Sapiro, 
2004). Thus, for example, young people on either side of a civil war are likely to have quite distinct but 
different attitudes towards the war rather than a single cohort perspective. We might, accordingly, 
conceive of ‘generation units’ – “the different relationships people from a single generation had with the 
original event” (Sapiro, 2004). Yet, as we develop below, when theorizing cohort effects on attitudes 
towards the EU, because there are few if any major events likely to throw up radically distinct groups 
within a given generation we are unlikely to observe such ‘generation units’ and each cohort is most 
appropriately modeled as a single group. 
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To understand generational differences in attitudes towards the EU we argue that two relatively 
uncontroversial aspects of the process of European integration are important - that the integration process 
is unidirectional and that public opposition to the EU is based in concern over the loss of national 
autonomy. The process is unidirectional in the sense that over time there has been progressively more 
integration. It is certainly true that integration has moved forward somewhat erratically and at a variable 
pace, both in terms of the EU’s function and its membership. However, at no point in the last fifty years 
has integration ever meaningfully or substantially been rolled back, in respect of either function or 
membership.
2
 In consequence, each new generation of Europeans has come of age in a Europe that is 
progressively more integrated than was the Europe of its predecessors.  
 
The second point to note is that at the core of Euro-sceptic attitudes (i.e. lack of support for the 
EU) is concern with the loss of national autonomy. The issues raised by the loss of autonomy vary quite 
markedly. On the left there is concern that the EU limits and undermines the capacity of national 
governments to regulate the national economy. On the right is the converse concern that regulations 
emanating from Brussels burden and constrain national economies. Some Greens are concerned with EU 
restrictions on the capacity of governments to pursue national environmental goals. Far-right parties are 
concerned with the loss of control over immigration and the fear of a consequent dilution of national 
culture and identity as immigration increases. Crucially, however, all critics of the EU are concerned with 
the loss of national autonomy that has accompanied the integration process. Opposition to the integration 
process is, at root, opposition to the process through which national autonomy has been surrendered to the 
EU. 
 
The foregoing points are important for cohort differences in attitude towards the EU because each 
new generation has come of age in a more integrated Europe, and thus an EU to which more national 
autonomy has been surrendered.  The level of national autonomy at the point in time at which a cohort 
comes of age can be thought of as the status quo for that generation – that is, the level of national 
autonomy that that generation will deem appropriate, or a baseline level of national autonomy, all else 
equal. Thus, the older the cohort the greater was the extent of national autonomy in that cohort’s 
formative years. Alternatively put, the younger the cohort the more integrated was Europe when they 
came of age. 
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 The one possible exception is Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds, where it has been argued that some 
“re-nationalization” of policy took place in the 1990s, though the assertion remains contentious (see, for 
example, Bachtler and Mendez, 2007). 
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The difference in the extent of national autonomy in a cohort’s formative years ought to affect 
attitudes towards the EU for two reasons. First, we might expect these differences to issue in a differential 
predisposition to Euro-scepticism. Younger generations with less experience of national autonomy should 
be less receptive to Euro-scepticism than their older counterparts. The sense of loss that is implicitly 
associated with Euro-scepticism is much less likely to resonate with younger generations, since younger 
generations are much less likely to bemoan a loss of national autonomy that they have never known. 
Moreover, younger generations may also be just as concerned about the consequences of rolling back the 
EU as about the consequences of further integrative steps. Rolling back the EU and re-establishing a 
greater degree of national autonomy may entail a reconfiguration of the world that is as equally unfamiliar 
to younger generations as a world in which there is yet further, deeper integration. In contrast, for older 
generations rolling back the EU may actually have a nostalgic appeal, entailing the return to a familiar, 
possibly more secure world. 
 
Second, the younger the cohort the deeper the extent of European integration in that cohort’s 
formative years and thus the greater the relative prominence or importance of the EU at the time the 
individual came of age. For example, an individual coming of age in the 1990s did so in an EU in which 
individuals had the right of free movement across Europe; in which the European Court of Justice 
provided an added measure of rights protection beyond national law; and an EU with symbols to anchor 
an affective attachment (i.e. a flag, a currency, passports, citizenship, driving licenses, license plates, an 
anthem, and even Europe Day
3
). In contrast, an individual coming of age in the 1960s was socialized in 
what could at best be described as a nascent ‘Europe’, with no European Economic Community-wide 
freedom of movement, no rights separate from those guaranteed by the national state and no symbols to 
anchor an affective attachment. In short, the very bases for identification with the EU have only 
developed over time, with the process of integration. Indeed, there was concern with fostering such 
attachments from the beginning of the project and early scholars anticipated such developments (e.g. 
Deutsch, et al, 1957; Haas, 1958). Consequently, to the extent that individuals have developed an 
attachment to the EU, it should be most evident in more recent generations. This is important because 
there is increasing evidence that those that self-identify as ‘European’ are more supportive of the EU than 
those that do not (Fligstein, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2006). Accordingly, we might 
also expect more recent generations to be more supportive of the EU.  
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 The relative importance of the anthem and Europe Day is debatable given that public awareness of them 
remains relatively low – in a Eurobarometer (2002) quiz on the EU only 27 per cent answered “true” to 
the statement “The European Union has its own anthem” and only 34 per cent answered “true” to the 
statement “Each year, Europe Day is observed in common by all Member States of the EU”. 
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There is certainly evidence to the effect that the young today are more likely than the old to self-
identify with Europe (Fligstein, 2008). The young are also less likely than the old to perceive the 
integration process as a threat to national autonomy (McLaren, 2006: 106). Consistent with this, as 
McLaren has (2006: 102-6) illustrated, the young are also less likely than the old to perceive immigrants 
as a threat to national culture. The young are also more likely than the old to be engaged with social and 
political movements that transcend national borders, such as opposition to globalization, the 
environmental movement and women’s movement (Inglehart, 1990 and 1995; Tilley, 2000). In short, on a 
number of dimensions the EU appears more in tune with the affective orientations of the young than the 
old. 
 
Hypothesis Two: Support for the European Union is greater in more recent cohorts than older cohorts. 
 
The preceding discussion is certainly anecdotally supportive of the notion that younger cohorts 
will be more supportive of the EU than older cohorts. Yet, as noted at the outset, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that these attitudinal differences are reflective of a life-cycle rather than a generational effect. 
Even if younger Europeans evince a greater affective attachment to the EU than older Europeans, this 
could well be reflective of youthful rebellion or a dalliance that effectively dissipates with time, age and a 
change in material and life circumstances in all generations, as we argued earlier would occur with a life-
cycle effect. As a result, whether life-cycle and cohort effects are at work and, if they are, which 
predominates is ultimately an empirical question. How to tackle these questions empirically is the issue to 
which we now turn. 
 
Data and Methodology 
In distinguishing between life-cycle and generational effects, an additional factor is likely to be 
important—period effects.  The use of time-series data (such as ours described below) necessitates some 
effort to control for the effects of time inherent in time varying processes.  Moreover, virtually all cross-
time studies of the EU control for time because it is typically significant.  Ideally, since we do not know 
the precise processes that underlie the formation of attitudes toward the EU, we would like to make as 
few assumptions as possible about period effects and allow these effects to vary not only annually but 
also for each country.  In consequence, however, the period effects will likely explain a considerable 
amount of variance in the model. As such, the estimates for any life-cycle or cohort effects that we 
identify are likely to be very conservative. 
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When measures of time are included in a model with age and cohort, there is a potential 
identification problem.  If each birth year marks a separate cohort, and each period of interest is a single 
year, then knowing the cohort to which the individual belongs, and the period in which age and cohort are 
measured, one can determine the respondent’s age, as Age=Period-Cohort.  The problem of identification 
is well known in studies of this type and there are a number of possible ways to approach identification 
(see for example, Feinberg and Mason, 1985; Tilley, 2002).  In order to estimate the effects of each of 
age, period, and cohort individually, we construct cohorts that encompass more than one birth year. This 
is consistent with our theoretical expectation that there are not sharp differences between cohorts born 
from one year to the next, but that distinctions are caused by relatively small changes over time such that 
meaningful divisions are only observed between those whose formative years are temporally distant from 
one another.  Yang and Land suggest this as a convenient way to identify such models, arguing that 
“…meaningful cohorts often are considered to be of durations longer than single years, it then will be 
feasible to group the cohort dimension into multiyear periods while retaining single-year measurements 
for the age and time period dimensions” (Yang and Land, 2008: 302). In constructing the cohorts in this 
manner, the model is no longer perfectly collinear--knowing a respondent’s cohort and the period, one 
cannot determine the exact age of the respondent, only a range of possible ages.  This is a sufficient 
condition to identify a model containing all three effects - age, cohort and period. 
 
Our analysis employs Eurobarometer data, and because these are repeated cross-sectional 
surveys, the data structure is cross-classified.  That is, individual respondents share commonalities by 
virtue of their membership in different clusters—country, period, and cohort.
4
  These commonalities (for 
period and cohort) are indeed quantities of interest in this project; they are the effects of cohort and period 
on support for integration.  We therefore use a model that is specifically designed to deal with this type of 
data—a cross random effects model (Yang and Land, 2008). This approach is able to account for the 
clustering (that violates the assumption of independent observations) at multiple levels by specifying 
random effect components, , which represent the individual’s deviation from the overall mean due to her 
membership in a particular cluster.  These deviations are assumed to be random realizations from a 
normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of .  We include random effects for cohort, and 
periods within countries.  For countries themselves, we use fixed effects (dummy variables).  The fixed 
effects reduce the computational burden and are necessitated because such effects are observed in 
virtually all extant work on the EU.  The cross random effects model thus allows us to take account of 
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 This structure differs from a hierarchical nested structure in that individuals’ membership in clusters at 
one level does not preclude membership in clusters at another level (each country is measured in each 
period and each cohort is measured in each period and country).  
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dependencies within the data and efficiently estimate life-cycle, cohort, and period effects, while 
controlling for other relevant variables.  
 
The model described can be expressed symbolically as: 
 =	
′		 + 		 	+ 	 	+		; 																																	Eq. 1 
	~	0,	the random effect for cohort	; 
~	0,	the random effect for period in each country	; 
	~	0, the individual level error term (residual) ; 
Where: 
i = individual,  t = period, 
c = country, g = cohort. 
	is the dependent variable and 
 is a vector of coefficients on the independent variables, , plus a 
constant term.   
 
We operationalize this model using data measured at the individual level from the Eurobarometer 
Mannheim trend file updated with more recent Eurobarometer surveys, covering the years 1976-2008 (for 
details about the data, variable wording and coding, see Appendix). The data allow us to analyze fifteen 
countries, for nine of which we have data across all years.  The dependent variable, support for the 
European Union is measured using the Eurobarometer membership question ‘Generally speaking, do you 
think that (your country’s) membership of the European Community is … a good thing, a bad thing, 
neither good nor bad’.   
 
To estimate the effect of life-cycle on attitudes towards the EU, we include age as an independent 
variable in the model.  Because of the small number of individuals over the age of 85 in the surveys, the 
uncertainty about estimates for these individuals increases substantially, and thus we focus our analysis 
on respondents age 15 to 85.  Our expectation is that the coefficient on age is negative, meaning declining 
support throughout the life-cycle.   
The random effects for cohort and period allow us to estimate the effects of these factors on EU 
support.  In devising the cohorts, we use as generational markers those events that give a qualitative 
distinction to different periods in the development of the EU. We distinguish between six different 
cohorts. The individuals of the first cohort are those that came of age before the first integrative steps 
were taken in 1952 (i.e. were age 15 or older in 1951). The second and third cohorts are those that came 
of age between the Treaty of Paris and the Merger Treaty, and, those that came of age between the 
Merger Treaty and the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA).  We do not expect that the second and 
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third cohorts will evince qualitatively distinct attitudes as the Merger Treaty did not represent a 
significant change in Europe of the same scale as the other integrative steps.  However, we were 
concerned that by grouping the second and third cohorts into a single cohort encompassing thirty-two 
years, and thus effectively two generations, we might miss a significant shift in the data. In an effort to be 
conservative, we therefore split these individuals into two cohorts.
5
  Our fourth cohort is comprised of 
those that came of age between the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty, and thus those coming of age once 
Europe had begun to acquire a tangible identity (i.e. a flag, an anthem, Europe day, and so on). The fifth 
cohort is comprised of those coming of age between Maastricht and the introduction of the Euro, and thus 
those coming of age in an EU in which the freedom to live, study, work, claim benefits and vote in any 
member state had become a defining characteristic of the EU.
6
 And finally, our sixth cohort is comprised 
of those coming of age after the introduction of the Euro. This sixth cohort includes those who have come 
of age in a Europe where there is not only a tangible identity and freedom of movement, but where there 
is a persistent, daily reminder of an integrated Europe (for a complete breakdown of the six cohorts see 
Appendix).     
 
Period is simply the year of the survey, but we identify each country-period combination 
uniquely, producing 416 separate random effects.
7
 We also include controls derived from extant work on 
attitudes towards the EU: an individual’s left/right political orientation, gender, occupation, education, 
and country fixed effects.
8
 While income has often been shown to be a significant predictor of attitudes 
towards the EU, changes in the way income has been measured across time and countries in the 
Eurobarometer data prohibit use of an income measure in our analysis. Income categories have been 
added, and the intervals changed over time, thus the income data lack a common metric (such as income 
quartiles, for example) rendering interpretation of unit changes in income categories nonsensical.  
However, with both education and occupation included in the analysis, the omission of income should not 
constitute a significant hurdle to accurate model estimation (see Appendix for details of the independent 
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 We have run the model with both specifications and there is no substantive distinction.  The two cohorts 
are statistically significantly different, but substantively, the differences are small. 
6
 Because of the salience and symbolic effect of the physical introduction of the Euro, we use its physical 
introduction in 2002 as the cutoff date rather than its introduction as an accounting device in 1999.   
7
 Since it is age and cohort in which we are interested, we do not report the 416 period effects, only the 
estimated standard deviation of their distribution— .  The detailed results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
8
 For an overview of individual level determinants of attitudes towards the EU, see Hooghe and Marks, 
2005. 
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variables).
9
 Finally, in coding the data, we follow the convention in cross random effects models of 
centering all continuous independent variables (age and left/right orientation) at the grand mean of the 
pooled data allowing us to interpret the random cohort and period effects as deviation from the overall 
mean (Yang and Land, 2008).  
 
Results 
We estimate Equation 1 using two different specifications, with and without the cohorts, in order 
to determine whether cohorts provide additional explanatory power.
10, 11
  All control variables are 
included in both models, although only the results for the variables of interest are reported in Table 1. The 
full results for all variables are displayed in Table A of the Appendix.  In Model 2, the random effect for 
cohorts is significant, and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) statistic is lower in the model with 
the cohort. The cohorts, therefore, do provide additional explanatory power and Model 2 can be said to be 
preferred over Model 1.  The discussion of the results will therefore focus on Model 2.   
<Table 1 about here> 
 
We can interpret the independent variables as we would in OLS—a one unit change in the independent 
variable results in a 
	unit change in the dependent variable when all variables are held constant at their 
means. Since our variables are centered at the grand mean, the constant (all variables at zero) represents 
the level of support for the respondent with the mean value of all the independent variables (or the 
excluded values for dummy variables).  
 
Consistent with most extant work on the EU, in both models age is negatively signed and 
statistically significant, the older an individual the less supportive they are of the EU. To provide a better 
sense of the results, Figure 1 below graphs the results of the model for cohort and age. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
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 We did attempt to include the income variable for those countries and years where the measure was 
most comparable.  The results were not substantively different from our findings here, but did 
substantially reduce the number of countries and periods able to be included in our analysis. 
10
 The model is estimated in Stata 10 using the xtmixed command. Estimation routines and data are 
available from the authors on request. 
11
 We also estimated separate models for each successive wave of integration – that is, we estimated the 
model once for the nine countries for which we have data at all time points (the original six plus Demark, 
Ireland and the UK), a second time including the third wave countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and a 
third time including the fourth wave countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) – and there was no 
substantive differences in the results.  All analyses not presented here are available from the authors on 
request.  
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 The predicted age effect ranges from -0.015 at age fifteen to -.083 at age eighty-five and thus 
across an individual’s lifespan we can expect support for the EU to drop by approximately 0.07.  
Although at first glance this effect may appear quite small, it is approximately 15% of the average 
variance in the dependent variable for a country/year (.47). It should also be remembered that the model 
was deliberately specified to generate conservative estimates of both life-cycle and cohort effects, to 
make for a more demanding test of an age effect.  
 
The random effects are not directly interpretable from the information provided in Table 1.  
Overall, cohorts and periods are statistically significant.  The magnitude of the cohort effects (the Best 
Linear Unbiased Predictions of the random effects—BLUPs) is displayed alongside age in Figure 1. The 
effect for each cohort, in ascending order, is: -.030, -.048, -.059, -.013 .032, 0.120 – and all are 
statistically significantly different from one another.
12
 The predicted random effects increase (if positive) 
or decrease (if negative) the level of support beyond the predicted level of support based on the 
independent variables.  For example, for an average Frenchman born before 1938, his predicted support 
would be 2.51 (with a period effect of zero), but were he born after 1987, his predicted support would be 
2.65.   Again the effect may appear small but it is 30% of the average variance in the dependent variable 
for a country/year. 
 
The predicted cohort effects are interesting in that there is a small decline in support for the EU 
across the early cohorts. That is, the cohort that came of age before the initiation of the integration process 
is slightly more supportive of membership than either of the cohorts that came of age between the Treaty 
of Paris and the SEA. Indeed, the second and third cohorts are progressively less supportive of the EU and 
it is only with the cohort that came of age after the SEA that we observe a break in the trend of declining 
support for the EU. These results are almost certainly being driven, at least in part, by differences in 
attitudes between individuals that had direct experience of the deprivation of the Great Depression and the 
horrors of World War II and those that did not. The European integration process was conceived as a 
vehicle to end war in Europe and as such can be expected to have particular appeal to those that lived 
through the war. Accordingly, although the first cohort had more experience of national autonomy than 
any of the subsequent cohorts, that experience was not wholly positive and any nostalgic feelings that 
subsequent cohorts might have for a world of less integration, is least likely to be evident for these 
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 We use the square root of the variance of the prediction errors (the comparative standard errors) to 
calculate confidence intervals for the BLUPs.  There are no overlapping confidence intervals among the 
predicted cohort effects at the 95% level (with only cohorts 1 and 4 overlapping at the 99% level). 
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individuals. That said, it should also be noted that while there are statistically significant differences 
between each of the first three cohorts the magnitude of those differences is very small, there is relatively 
little difference between each of the first three cohorts. 
 
 Of more importance, the cohorts that came of age after the SEA are progressively more 
supportive of the EU than their immediate predecessors. Indeed, there is a 7.2% increase in the average 
level of support for the EU between the cohort that came of age in the period 1952-1971 and the most 
recent cohort, born after 1986.  Thus, cohorts that came of age after the EU had begun to acquire an 
identity (e.g. the flag, Europe Day, driving licenses, passports, a currency, and so on) are significantly 
more supportive of the EU than those that came of age when the EU lacked such an identity. Moreover, 
for these later cohorts, the upward trend in support from one cohort to another is both comparatively large 
and increasing in each subsequent cohort.
13
 It may be tempting to conclude, and the results certainly 
imply, that future cohorts will demonstrate even higher levels of support for the EU. While certainly a 
possibility it should also be stressed that the period effects appear more substantial than the age effects. 
The estimated period random effects by country (BLUPs) appear in Figure 2 below. 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
 As is clear from the graphs in Figure 2, the period effects vary quite markedly from country to 
country. Consistent with extant work, we observe a tendency towards lower support for the EU in the 
1990s than the 1970s in the original six and higher support in the 1990s than the 1970s for Denmark, the 
UK and Ireland (see for example, Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; Down and Wilson, 2008). Critically, 
however, with the exception of Austria, Finland and Sweden, for which we have only limited data, 
support fluctuates substantially over time in every country. In short these period effects appear 
idiosyncratic—although there is a general trend in the positive direction, short-term forces are just as 
likely to propel support upward as downward.   
 
 The results discussed here help explain how extant work has generated seemingly contradictory 
results for an age effect – that is, earlier work showing either no relationship or a significant positive 
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 The results are remarkably similar when the analyses are run separately for each of the fifteen member 
states. Thus, the more recent cohorts are more supportive of the EU than are earlier cohorts (only in 
Greece is this not the case) and in almost all countries there is a clear upturn in support amongst post-SEA 
cohorts (Greece, Ireland and Spain are exceptions, but in these countries support is relatively static post-
SEA and was high prior to the SEA). Results of the individual country analyses and accompanying graphs 
are available from the authors on request. 
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relationship between age and support while later work shows a significant negative relationship.
14
 The 
earlier analyses employed Eurobarometer data from the 1970s and 1980s, meaning that the first three of 
our cohorts would have been present in the analyses, cohort four would have been partially represented 
but cohorts five and six would be absent. This has the potential to create a conflict between a cohort and 
life-cycle effect. While support may decline over the life-cycle, implying age is inversely related to 
support, the more positive orientations of the pre-integration generation, relative to subsequent cohorts, 
could generate a positive relationship between age and support. Accordingly, the effect for life-cycle 
could conflict with that for cohort. Consequently the sign and significance of an age variable might prove 
sensitive to the scope of the data in the earlier analyses. In contrast, more recent analyses, that include the 
more recent and relatively more supportive cohorts, generate a clear negative relationship between age 
and support. Thus, with these later cohorts included the overall effects of life-cycle and generation are 
consistent – that is, the young are more supportive than the old. 
 
 To both further probe and to better illustrate the point, we ran OLS regressions on the 
membership question using age and the same set of controls employed in the preceding analyses, along 
with country fixed effects, for each year from 1975-2008. We then divided the regression results into 
three categories, instances in which age was positive and significant, instances in which age was negative 
and significant, and, instances in which age was not a significant predictor of attitudes towards 
membership, summed across each decade. The results are summarized in Table 2 below. 
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
 The only instance in which age proved a positive and significant predictor of attitudes towards 
membership occurred in 1975, the earliest date for which we have data. This is the year in the dataset in 
which the oldest cohort can be expected to feature most prominently and in which cohorts four through 
six are entirely absent.
15
 For three of the five years in the 1970s, for all ten years in the 1980s and for four 
of the first five years in the 1990s (i.e. 1991-4) age is not a significant predictor of attitudes towards 
membership. In stark contrast, from 1995-2008 the age variable is a significant negative predictor of 
attitudes towards membership in twelve out of fourteen years. In short, we observe age move from having 
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 On the young being more supportive than the old see, Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Fligstein, 2008; 
McLaren, 2002 and 2006; Rohrschneider, 2002; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002. On the converse and 
indeterminate results see Andersen and Reichert, 1995; Gabel 1998a. 
15
 It should be noted that for 1975 we lack data on left/right self-placement (which is why we exclude this 
year from our random effects models), and so cannot rule out the possibility that this may be affecting the 
result for that year.  
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a largely indeterminate association with support to having a clear negative association as the cohort 
composition of the data changes.  Thus, without taking into account the generational components of the 
data, cross-sectional analyses may conflate life-cycle and cohort effects in a single variable age. 
 
 Lastly, we should also address the implications of our analysis for future support of the EU 
because of the current and quite pronounced population ageing process in Europe. In the context of a 
rapidly aging population, the life-cycle effect and the cohort effect have contradictory implications for 
future support of the EU. The life-cycle effect implies that as the population ages so support for the EU 
will decline as the elderly comprise an ever larger proportion of the population. Yet, because the more 
recent cohorts are more supportive than older cohorts, as the latter die out so we can expect support for 
the EU to increase into the future. While the results of our analysis suggest that the cohort effect is more 
significant, substantively, than the life-cycle effect, which of the two actually predominates will also be 
contingent on the extent of the population ageing process. Put simply, the more extensive the population 
ageing process, and thus the smaller the proportion of the population accounted for by the later cohorts 
relative to earlier cohorts, the greater the impact of the life-cycle effect relative to the cohort effect. 
 
 To provide some idea about the possible long-run implications of life-cycle and cohort in the 
context of an aging European population, we provide a simulation of the change in these effects from 
2007 to 2022 using our model estimates, current population estimates, and current death rates.  We 
gathered data from 2007, for each country in our analysis, of the number of people at each age from 0 to 
85 years and the percentage that died at each age.
16
  Based on these, we then predicted the number of 
people at each age between 15 and 85 for the years 2008-2022 (we limit our projections to the same age 
range—15 to 85 year olds—on which our estimates are based).  We adjusted the effect of cohort and age 
by the numbers of people at each age in the population of each country, holding all other factors constant.  
To ensure our estimates were conservative, we assumed that all future cohorts have the same effect as the 
last cohort estimated in the original data (the Euro cohort) and that death rates for each age will be the 
same in 2022 as in 2007, despite the fact that our model suggests that future cohorts will likely be more 
supportive than their predecessors and that demographic trends suggest death rates will decline.  The 
results for the combined populations of the countries in our study are displayed graphically in Figure 3. 
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 Data are from the Eurostat web database for national demography and mortality indicators.  Population 
size is measured using the demo-panj data (population by age on January 1 of 2007).  Death rates were 
calculated using the demo-majec data (deaths by age at last birthday).  These data are available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database [last accessed 5/22/09].  In 
the few cases where Eurostat data were missing, we were able to collect statistics from The Human 
Mortality Database at http://www.mortality.org/ [last accessed 5/22/09]. 
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<Figure 3 about here> 
 
As shown by the solid line, the effect of age alone—no cohort effect—implies a slight decline in 
support over the 15 year period.  If cohort and period effects were to remain constant, support is expected 
to decline by 0.003 over the period as a function of the life-cycle effect.  This is because as the population 
ages, a larger proportion of Europeans are in the latter part of the life-cycle which is associated with lower 
support levels than for the young.  In other words, the decline of the young as a proportion of the 
population causes the balance of opinion to become more negative over time. In contrast, the cohort effect 
alone—no life-cycle effect—(the dashed line) indicates we should expect an increase in support of 0.03 
over time.  This conservative estimate is almost four and a half times the variance in the average annual 
level of support across our sample of Western European countries from 1976 to 2008 (.0068).  As the 
more recent, more supportive cohorts begin to replace their less supportive predecessors, overall support 
for the EU will increase.
17
  When these two effects are combined, the cohort effects clearly dominate, 
increasing support in Western Europe by .028 or more than four times the variance in the average annual 
level of support across our sample; they are carried throughout the life-cycle, thus muting the effect of the 
aging process.  So, while the life-cycle effect, in combination with an aging population, lowers support, 
this effect is clearly outweighed by the higher levels of support among younger cohorts.  Even if future 
generations fail to show levels of support as high as those born in the 80s and 90s, if current population 
trends persist, the more Europhilic generations will have an enduring positive effect on levels of support 
for Europe for some time to come. 
 
However, one potentially important qualifier is in order. While we can expect support for the EU 
to increase in the future as a consequence of cohort effects outweighing life-cycle effects, this only 
constitutes part of the story when considering public opinion on the EU. Because older individuals are 
more likely to participate politically, and particularly to vote, than their younger counterparts, they are 
also likely to be more politically relevant than their numbers alone would suggest. Political parties pay 
attention to those that participate politically and if the more pro-EU young fail to engage to the same 
extent as their less supportive elders, it is the latter’s preferences that are likely to inform the positions 
parties adopt on the EU and thus the future of the EU. Accordingly, Euro-enthusiasts should not be too 
sanguine about the prospects of future party support for the EU, in the short-term, it may even decline in 
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 By 2022 all of cohort 1 and half of cohort 2 will have been replaced by new cohorts in our simulation, 
as we only include those age 85 and younger.  
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the wake of higher aggregate support if that support is concentrated amongst the less politically active 
young. 
 
Conclusion 
 We have shown not only that age effects support for the European Union but that an individual’s 
attitudes are determined by both the stage they are at in the life-cycle and the generation into which they 
were born. The opportunities afforded by the EU appear to undergird a life-cycle effect in which support 
declines as individual’s age and those opportunities consequently become less relevant. The cohort effect 
is slightly more complex. The generation of Europeans that lived through the Great Depression and the 
Second World War are more supportive of the EU than immediately subsequent generations. Indeed, 
across the first three cohorts we observe a small but significant decline in support from one cohort to the 
next. That is, the EU receives progressively less support the further removed a generation is from the 
experience of the Depression and the War. Yet, when the EU begins to acquire a visible identity, cohorts 
begin to evince progressively higher levels of support than their predecessors. Each new generation that 
comes of age from the mid-1980s onwards is significantly more supportive of the EU than its immediate 
predecessor.  
We also observe, however, that in the context of European demographic changes these age effects 
work at cross-purposes. The ageing of the population implies a decline in future support, while the 
replacement of older cohorts by more recent cohorts implies an increase in future support. The cohort 
effect appears to predominate suggesting we can expect an increase in popular support for the EU in the 
future. Interestingly, however, given the greater propensity for political participation on the part of the 
old, we cannot rule out demographic change contributing to political parties actually adopting more 
negative positions on the EU in the future, even if public opinion becomes more positive. 
 
In addition, we have been able to explain the apparent inconsistency between the age-support 
relationship suggested by earlier analyses (i.e. positive or indeterminate) and the relationship evident in 
later analyses (i.e. negative). The important general point is that at times life-cycle and cohort may have 
theoretically contradictory effects that in empirical analyses result in an indicator of age being incorrectly 
identified as unrelated to the phenomenon of interest. Accordingly, sensitivity to the potential for life-
cycle and cohort effects to operate at cross-purposes is an important consideration for future work since a 
non-significant result need not mean age is not a significant determinant of a given attitude. Put simply, 
the precise meaning of the age variable needs to be properly specified in both theory and measurement. In 
relation to the EU more specifically, our analysis suggests not only that age should be included in all 
17 
 
future models of support but that if it proves not to be a significant predictor of attitudes the results 
warrant closer examination.  
 
Finally, contemporary work has also begun to address variation in attitudes across a variety of 
‘EU issues’, particularly support for different policies being set at the EU level (see for example, Hooghe, 
2003). Given the clear generational differences in attitudes towards membership of the EU, it may be 
fruitful in such analyses to distinguish between cohorts, to identify whether, where and to what extent 
there are generational differences in respect to preferences over the location of policy-making. Put simply, 
we ought to address whether there are generational differences in the willingness of individual’s to see a 
given policy set at the EU level. If younger cohorts prove generally more supportive of a particular policy 
being set at the EU level then even if overall support is not strong today it may well emerge in the future. 
Alternatively, if there is no generational difference in attitudes to a policy being decided at the EU level 
and support is lacking, we may well be observing an important limit or boundary to future integration in 
the given policy area.  
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Table 1: 
Cross Random Effects Models of Life-Cycle, Cohort and Period Effects 
Support for Membership of the European Union 
 
  Model 1 
No Cohort 
 Model 2 
w/Cohort 
     
Age  -.001*  -.001* 
  (.0001)  (.0001) 
     
Constant  2.52*  2.55* 
  (.040)  (.033) 
     
Random Effects:     
Cohort         .061* (.018) 
     
Year         .123* (.004)  .124* (.004) 
     
Residual    .675* 
(.001) 
 .675* 
(.001) 
     
N  739126  739126 
     
Log Likelihood  -759581*  -759183* 
     
BIC  1519582  1518799 
*p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses.  
NB: Full results including controls are displayed in Table A, Appendix. 
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Figure 1: 
Predicted Support for Membership of the European Union, 
by age and cohort 
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Figure 2: 
Predicted Period Random Effects, 
by member state 
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Table 2: 
Sign and Statistical Significance of Age - Support for EU Membership, 1975-2008 
(Proportion of Years, per decade) 
 1970s 
(5) 
1980s 
(10) 
1990s 
(10) 
2000s 
(9) 
     
Significant and 
Positive 
20% - - - 
     
Significant and 
Negative 
20% - 60% 89% 
     
Not Significant 60% 100% 40% 11% 
Significant if p < 0.01. NB: Number of years per decade in parentheses. 
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Figure 3: 
Predicted Effects of Population Change on Support for Membership in the European Union: 
Life-Cycle & Cohort Effects, 2007-2022 
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APPENDIX 
Data 
The Mannheim trend file (ICPSR study number 4357) covers the year 1970-2002.  We are unable 
to use data from years prior to 1975 because key variables used in the analysis are missing in those years.  
We merge Eurobarometers 58.1, 59.1, 60.1, 61.0, 62.0, 63.4, 64.2, 65.2, 66.1, 67.2, 68.1, and 69.2 (those 
containing the membership trend question) into the Mannheim data to extend the dataset to 2008. 
Dependent Variable 
 Responses to the Eurobarometer membership question that address perceptions of country 
benefits from the EU. That is, ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (your country’s) membership of the 
European Community is … a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad.’ 
Independent Variables Definition 
Age Years of age (centered) 
Range from 15 to 85 
Cohort Pre-Integration Cohort - Born on or before 1938 
Post-Integration Cohort - Born between 1939-1951 
Merger Cohort - Born between 1952-1971 
SEA Cohort - Born between 1972-1977 
Maastricht Cohort - Born between 1978-1986 
EMU Cohort - Born on or after 1987 
Left/Right Left/Right self placement, (centered) 
Gender Female “1”, Male “0” 
Occupation: Categories refer to the Mannheim data codes 
Professional EB occupation categories 120, 210, 132, 220 
White Collar EB occupation categories 230, 310, 311, 312 
Service EB occupation categories 320, 321, 322 
Petit Bourgeois EB occupation categories 130, 131 
Blue Collar EB occupation categories 410, 411, 412, 413 
Farmer/Fisherman EB occupation categories 110, 111, 112 
Homemaker EB occupation categories 500, 510 
Student/Military EB occupation categories 520, 521, 522 
Unemployed EB occupation categories 540 
Retired EB occupation categories 
Education:  
Education (High) Stopped education when older than 20 
Education (Low) Stopped education when 15 or younger 
Education (Medium) Stopped education between 16-19 years 
Countries and Years Included In Analysis 
 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom 
 
1976-2008 
Greece 1980-2008 
Spain, Portugal 1985-2008 
Austria, Finland, Sweden 1995-2008 
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Table A: 
Cross Random Effects Models of Life-Cycle, Cohort and Period Effects 
Support for Membership of the European Union 
 
  Model 1 
No Cohort 
 Model 2 
w/Cohort 
Age  -.001*  -.001* 
  (.0001)  (.0001) 
     
Left/Right  .025*  .024* 
  (.000)  (.000) 
     
Female  -.060*  -.060* 
  (.002)  (.002) 
     
Professional  .106*  .117* 
  (.004)  (.004) 
     
White Collar  .058*  .068* 
  (.003)  (.003) 
     
Service  -.021*  -.011 
  (.004)  (.004) 
     
Petit Bourgeois  -.015*  -.005 
  (.004)  (.004) 
     
Blue Collar  -.068*  -.058* 
  (.003)  (.003) 
     
Farmer/Fishermen  .002  .009 
  (.006)  (.006) 
     
Homemaker  .009  .016* 
  (.003)  (.003) 
     
Student/Military  .081*  .055* 
  (.004)  (.005) 
     
Unemployed  -.091*  -.085* 
  (.004)  (.004) 
     
Education (Low)  -.085*  -.088* 
  (.002)  (.002) 
     
Education (High)  .093*  .098* 
  (.002)  (.002) 
     
Austria  -.308*  -.312* 
  (.040)  (.040) 
     
Belgium  .101*  .101* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Denmark  -.260*  -.259* 
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  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Finland  -.311*  -.316* 
  (.040)  (.040) 
     
Germany, West  .036  .037 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Greece  .014  .015 
  (.032)  (.032) 
     
Ireland  .125*  .125* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Italy  .199*  .200* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Luxembourg  .256*  .255* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Netherlands  .238*  .239* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Portugal  .129*  .128* 
  (.033)  (.033) 
     
Spain  .148*  .144* 
  (.033)  (.033) 
     
Sweden  -.428*  -.433* 
  (.040)  (.040) 
     
UK  -.321*  -.322* 
  (.031)  (.031) 
     
Constant  2.52*  2.55* 
  (.040)  (.033) 
Random Effects     
Cohort     .061* (.018) 
     
Year       .123* (.004) 
 .124* 
(.004) 
     
Residual   .675* 
(.001) 
 .675* 
(.001) 
N  739126  739126 
Log Likelihood  -759581*  -759183* 
BIC  1519582  1518799 
*p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. NB: Reference categories for the dummy variables are 
Male, Retired, Education (Medium) and France. 
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